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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-1808 
____________ 
 
LEON HUGH GAVASKAR MATTIE, 
    Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                  Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. (A043-216-217)  
Immigration Judge: Margaret R. Reichenberg 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2014 
 
Before:  FISHER, VANASKIE and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 29, 2014 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Petitioner Leon Hugh Gavaskar Mattie (“Mattie”) petitions for review of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we 
will deny the petition for review. 
 Mattie, a Jamaican and lawful permanent resident of the United States, was 
convicted following a guilty plea in the New Jersey Superior Court of manufacturing, 
2 
 
distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute “one ounce [28.35 grams] or more but 
less than five pounds” of marijuana, in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:35-5(a) and 
2C:35-(5)(b)(11).  He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 3 years.  A Notice to 
Appear for removal proceedings was issued and, ultimately, Mattie conceded that he was 
removable under Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien who after admission was convicted of an offense relating to 
a controlled substance, other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use 
of 30 grams or less of marijuana. 
 Mattie, represented by Legal Services of New Jersey, applied for cancellation of 
removal, INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3), contending that possession with 
intent to distribute marijuana was not an aggravated felony that rendered him statutorily 
ineligible, and that he merited, as a matter of discretion, relief from removal.  The 
Government submitted Mattie’s conviction records, which included the judgment of 
conviction, the indictment, an evidence receipt, a lab report, the guilty plea and 
sentencing transcripts, the presentence report, an intake form, and a signed guilty plea 
form.  At his merits hearing, among other things, Mattie acknowledged that the amount 
of marijuana seized from the apartment was 63.73 grams, but he testified that only a 
small amount of it – 3-5 “nickel bags” – belonged to him for his personal use; the rest 
belonged to others in the apartment, specifically the co-defendants.  He testified that he 
was sure that the amount of marijuana that actually belonged to him was less than 30 
grams.   
 The Immigration Judge denied relief, concluding that Mattie had not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal.  
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Addressing the essential question whether Mattie had met his burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he had not been convicted of a disqualifying 
aggravated felony, the IJ reasoned that he would have to show that his conviction under § 
2C:35-5b(11) involved a “small amount of marijuana for no remuneration,” see 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(b)(4) (exception for person who violates subsection § 841(a)(1) by distributing a 
“small amount” of marijuana for no remuneration, and treating that person as provided 
for in 21 U.S.C. § 844).  In endeavoring to meet his burden of proof, he was entitled to 
present evidence outside of the record of conviction pursuant to Matter of Castro 
Rodriguez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 698 (BIA 2012).  Moreover, the guiding standard for what 
constitutes a small amount would be 30 grams or less of marijuana, see id. at 703.   
 The IJ then found that Mattie had pleaded guilty to possessing at least one ounce 
of marijuana, or 28.35 grams, and that the evidence of record established that the amount 
of the seized marijuana actually was 63.73 grams.  The IJ found that 63.73 grams of 
marijuana is not a “small amount” within the meaning of the law.  The IJ was not 
persuaded by Mattie’s testimony that he was in possession of no more than 30 grams of 
marijuana with no intent to sell it, noting that his testimony that he possessed only 3-5 
“nickel bags,” which he estimated would weigh less than a gram each, was actually 
contrary to his guilty plea to possessing at least an ounce, or 28.35 grams of marijuana.  
Moreover, Mattie did not present any other evidence to corroborate his claim that only a 
part of the 63 grams was attributable to him.  After lodging an appeal with the Board of 
Immigration Appeals, Mattie, through his counsel, filed a motion to remand based on 
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (U.S. 2013), which the Board granted, noting that 
Moncrieffe rejected the procedures set forth in Matter of Castro-Rodriguez. 
4 
 
 On remand, Mattie argued, again through counsel, that possession with intent to 
distribute at least one ounce of marijuana was not categorically an aggravated felony, 
because § 2C:35-5(b)(11) would allow the conviction of one who had distributed as little 
as five grams of marijuana for no remuneration.  A.R. 148.  Mattie argued that 
consideration by the agency of the evidence regarding the actual conduct relating to his 
conviction was prohibited by Moncrieffe. 
 The IJ held oral argument on September 19, 2013, after which Mattie’s application 
for cancellation of removal again was denied.  The IJ again held that Mattie had the 
burden of proof to show that possession with intent to deliver was not categorically an 
aggravated felony, citing with approval Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012), 
Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 2011), and Garcia v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1288, 
1289-90 (10th Cir. 2009).  However, under Moncrieffe, Mattie need only show that the 
least culpable conduct to support a conviction under § 2C:35-5b(11) would not qualify as 
an aggravated felony.  Moreover, a single conviction for distributing a small amount of 
marijuana for no remuneration would be deemed a simple possession offense subject to 
the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 844, and would, therefore, be a misdemeanor, not a felony, 
under federal law.  See Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693-94.  Applying Moncrieffe, the IJ 
found that Mattie had pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, possession with intent to 
distribute at least one ounce, or 28.35 grams, of marijuana.  Although 30 grams is a 
“useful guidepost” for what constitutes a small amount of marijuana, the Supreme Court 
in Moncrieffe expressly declined to decide this issue.  The IJ turned to our decision in 
Catwell v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 623 F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2010), where we suggested that a 
“small amount” of marijuana is the amount that one person would use on one occasion in 
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a social setting, and is thus much less than 30 grams.  The IJ noted that Moncrieffe 
involved 2-3 marijuana cigarettes, and reasoned that the 28.35 grams called for in § 
2C:35-5b(11) could not be a “small amount” because it equaled, under the “calculus” 
used in Catwell, at least 55 marijuana cigarettes.  The IJ again ordered that Mattie be 
removed to Jamaica.  
 Still represented by Legal Services of New Jersey, Mattie again appealed to the 
Board, contending that N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5b(11), like the Georgia statute addressed 
in Moncrieffe, proscribes conduct punishable only as a misdemeanor, and therefore 
Mattie was statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal.  Mattie argued that, as in 
Moncrieffe, the aggravated felony inquiry relating to a marijuana distribution statute can 
only include the necessary elements for a conviction under the state statute, and not the 
actual conduct or facts of an applicant’s particular conviction. 
 On March 13, 2014, the Board dismissed the appeal.  The Board held that Mattie’s 
offense categorically qualified as an aggravated felony, even under Moncrieffe.  The 
Board explained that Moncrieffe involved the transfer of a small amount of marijuana for 
no remuneration, but to be convicted under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(b)(11), Mattie was 
required to have in his possession, with an intent to distribute, “one ounce or more but 
less than five pounds,” id.  Mattie’s argument that § 2C:35-5(b)(11) would allow the 
conviction of one who had distributed as little as five grams of marijuana was plainly 
wrong, because, to be convicted under the state statute, one would have to have in his 
possession, with an intent to distribute, at least one ounce, or 28.25 grams; 5 grams would 
not result in a conviction.  The Board cited Catwell, 623 F.3d at 209, and noted that, in 
reviewing the legislative history of the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), we had 
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observed that the exception in § 841(b)(4) applies to social sharing situations involving 
no more than a few grams of marijuana.  The Board stated that, although 30 grams or less 
of marijuana is sometimes a “useful guidepost” for what constitutes a small amount of 
marijuana, this guidepost should not apply to a situation like Mattie’s involving 
possession with intent to distribute between one ounce and 5 pounds of marijuana. 
 Mattie has appealed the Board’s decision pro se.  We have jurisdiction under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (review of constitutional claims or questions of law not 
precluded); Pierre v.  Att’y Gen. of U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2008).  On June 19, 
2014, we granted Mattie’s motion for a stay of removal and advised him that we would 
entertain a request for appointment of his Legal Services of New Jersey counsel.  Mattie 
has not asked us to appoint him counsel.  In his pro se brief, he argues that he has met his 
burden to show that he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony, and relies on 
Moncrieffe  and Wilson v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2003), where we held that 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(b)(11), does not contain sale for remuneration as an element. 
 We will deny the petition for review.  Where, as here, the Board agrees with the 
IJ’s analysis and adds analysis of its own, we review the decisions of both the Board and 
the IJ. See Sandie v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009).  In order to be 
eligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C.§1229b(a), the applicant must 
establish that he “(1) has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 
five years, (2) has resided in the United States continuously for seven years after having 
been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(1)-(3).  “An alien bears the burden of establishing his eligibility for 
discretionary cancellation of removal.”  Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 
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464 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009).  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8 (“The 
respondent shall have the burden of establishing that he or she is eligible for any 
requested benefit or privilege…”).  “If the evidence indicates that one or more of the 
grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may apply, the alien shall have 
the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that such grounds do not 
apply.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d). 
 The New Jersey statute at issue here provides that “it shall be unlawful for any 
person knowingly or purposely: (1) To manufacture, distribute or dispense, or to possess 
or have under his control with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled 
dangerous substance or controlled substance analog.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(a)(1).  
Any person who violates subsection (a) with respect to: (11) Marijuana in a quantity of 
one ounce or more but less than five pounds . . . is guilty of a crime of the third degree.”  
See id. at § 2C:35-5(b)(11).  Because Mattie was seeking discretionary relief, he had the 
burden of proving that he had not been convicted of a disqualifying aggravated felony.  
Mattie was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his § 2C:35-
5(b)(11) conviction under state law is not an aggravated felony under the INA.   
 In his pro se brief on appeal, Mattie has cited our decision in Wilson, 350 F.3d at 
381-82, where we held that § 2C:35-5(b)(11) does not contain sale for remuneration as an 
element of the offense, arguing that it is dispositive of the only issue presented by his 
petition for review.  In Wilson, we held that the alien’s § 2C:35-5(b)(11) conviction was 
not analogous to a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) because § 841(b)(4) provided 
an exception for a person who violates § 841(a) by distributing a small amount of 
marijuana for no remuneration, see id. at 381.  We did not decide the “small amount” 
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issue, however, and we remanded the matter for a determination whether the state court 
conviction was an aggravated felony under the INA because it was a drug trafficking 
crime, see id. at 382.  Wilson thus does not resolve the issue presented by this petition for 
review.   
 We agree with the agency that Mattie failed to meet his burden of proof to show 
that he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony, as required for cancellation of 
removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(3).  A state offense constitutes a felony punishable under the 
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”), and thus is an aggravated felony under the INA, 
only if it proscribes conduct punishable as a felony under the CSA.  The CSA makes it a 
felony to knowingly or intentionally “manufacture, distribute, or dispense,” any amount 
of marijuana, except that “distributing a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration” 
is treated as a misdemeanor as provided in 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(4).  “A state 
marijuana conviction is therefore only [categorically] equivalent to a federal drug felony 
if the offense involved payment or more than a small amount of marijuana.”  Evanson v. 
Att’y Gen. of U.S., 550 F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 2008).  In Moncrieffe, the Government 
bore the burden of proof to show that the alien was removable as charged, and argued 
that the alien’s Georgia possession with intent to distribute marijuana conviction, 
involving 1.3 grams of marijuana found in his car by the police, was an aggravated felony 
because possession of marijuana with intent to distribute is a CSA offense, 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a), punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment under § 841(b)(1)(D).  The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, rejecting Moncrieffe’s reliance on § 841(b)(4).   
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and addressed whether the INA’s definition 
of aggravated felony encompassed “a state criminal statute that extends to the social 
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sharing of a small amount of marijuana.”  Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1682.  The Court 
discussed the penalty provisions -- § 841(b)(1)(D) and § 841(b)(4) – and stated:  “These 
dovetailing provisions create two mutually exclusive categories of punishment for CSA 
marijuana distribution offenses: one a felony, and one not.  The only way to know 
whether a marijuana distribution offense is ‘punishable as a felony’ under the CSA, is to 
know whether the conditions described in paragraph (4) are present or absent.”  133 S. 
Ct. at 1686 (footnote and citation omitted).  Moncrieffe’s conviction standing alone did 
not reveal either whether remuneration or more than a small amount of marijuana was 
involved, and thus the conviction could have corresponded to either a felony or a 
misdemeanor offense under the CSA.  The ambiguity on this point meant that the 
conviction did not necessarily involve facts that corresponded to an offense punishable as 
a felony under the CSA, see id. at 1687, and, therefore, the Government failed to prove 
that Moncrieffe was removable as charged.   
 Applying Moncrieffe, we note that the statute at issue here, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 
2C:35-5(b)(11), even if it does not require sale for remuneration, specifically references 
the smallest amount of marijuana required for a conviction, one ounce or 28.35 grams.  
Mattie’s conviction, standing alone, thus reveals the amount of marijuana involved.  
Because § 2C:35-5(b)(11) contains as an element of the offense a specific amount of 
marijuana, Mattie must show that the minimum amount specified by the statute, one 
ounce, or 28.35 grams, is a “small amount” of marijuana under the CSA.  The Supreme 
Court left open in Moncrieffe the meaning of “small amount,” noting that the CSA does 
not define the term.  133 S. Ct. at 1686 n.7.  To answer the question that Moncrieffe left 
open, the Board properly turned to our decision in Catwell, 623 F.3d 199.  Catwell holds 
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that 120.9 grams is not a “small amount” of marijuana for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(4), but we also noted in Catwell this bit of CSA legislative history: “The 
comments made during consideration of the amendment lead us to conclude that 
Congress contemplated and intended ‘small amount’ to mean the amount of marijuana an 
individual would be likely to use on a single occasion, in a social setting.  [T]hat amount 
would be no more than one or two marijuana cigarettes, or a few grams of marijuana.”  
623 F.3d at 209.  We noted that, under the federal sentencing Guidelines, one marijuana 
cigarette is equivalent to .5 grams, see id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1). 
 Since 28.35 grams of marijuana is quite a bit more than “a few grams of 
marijuana,” it certainly appears that § 2C:35-5(b)(11), although it does not include sale 
for remuneration as an element of the proscribed conduct, Wilson, 350 F.3d at 381-82, 
involves more than a “small amount” of marijuana, see Evanson, 550 F.3d at 289 (“A 
state marijuana conviction is therefore only [categorically] equivalent to a federal drug 
felony if the offense involved payment or more than a small amount of marijuana.”).  
Accordingly, we seriously doubt that Mattie has met his burden of proof to show that he 
has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and thus is statutorily eligible for 
cancellation of removal.   
 We acknowledge that one ounce or 28.35 grams, see § 2C:35-5(b)(11), is less than 
the Board’s “useful guidepost” of 30 grams, and that there is thus room for debating 
whether 28.35 grams is a “small amount” of marijuana, see, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (providing for an exemption from removal for controlled substance 
offender aliens who have possessed “for one’s own use … 30 grams or less of 
marijuana.”) (emphasis added).  See also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (Attorney General may 
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waive inadmissibility where conviction is “a single offense of simple possession of 30 
grams or less of marijuana”).  But we recently joined other federal appeals courts in 
holding that an “inconclusive record is insufficient to satisfy a noncitizen’s burden of 
proving eligibility for discretionary relief.”  Syblis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., --- F.3d ---, 
2014 WL 4056557, at *5 (3d Cir. August 18, 2014).  In doing so, we cited with approval 
the very cases cited by the IJ, Young, 697 F.3d 976, Salem, 647 F.3d 111, and Garcia, 
584 F.3d 1288.  In Syblis, the noncitizen applicant had a conviction for possession of 
drug paraphernalia under Va. Code Ann. § 54.1–3466, and argued that Va. Code Ann. § 
54.1–3466 does not relate to controlled substances under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 
and thus he was eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under § 1182(h).  Because we 
resolved this issue in favor of the Government, see id. at *5, the noncitizen applicant then 
argued that the substance involved in his conviction was not defined by federal law.  The 
record, however, was inconclusive with respect to the specific substance involved.  We 
held that the “burden-shifting scheme associated with removal proceedings” would 
determine the outcome, id. at *5, and, because the record was inconclusive, the 
noncitizen applicant could not prevail.   
 Although Syblis involved a purely factual issue concerning the specific substance 
involved and an inadequate record of conviction, its reasoning applies here.  Because 
Mattie was convicted of possession with intent to deliver at least one ounce of marijuana, 
he had to prove that one ounce, or 28.35 grams, is a “small amount” of marijuana under 
the CSA, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(4), in order to establish that he has not been 
convicted of an aggravated felony.  The agency decided that issue adversely to him, 
concluding that a “small amount” under the CSA is the amount usually involved in social 
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sharing, i.e., “no more than a few grams.”  See Catwell, 623 F.3d at 208-09 (reviewing 
legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4)).  Mattie has contended in his pro se brief that   
28 grams is a small amount under our decision in Wilson, but we have rejected that 
argument because Wilson did not address or decide the small amount issue.  Moreover, 
we cannot conclude that one ounce, or 28.35 grams, of marijuana is a “small amount” 
under the CSA simply because 30 grams is the Board’s “useful guidepost.”  More is 
required here.
 1
  We note that Mattie’s counsel argued before the agency that possession 
with intent to distribute at least one ounce of marijuana was not categorically an 
aggravated felony because § 2C:35-5(b)(11) would allow the conviction of one who had 
distributed as little as five grams of marijuana for no remuneration.  A.R. 148.  We agree 
with the Board that this is flatly incorrect.  To be convicted under § 2C:35-5(b)(11), one 
is required to have in his possession, with an intent to distribute, at least one ounce, or 
28.25 grams; 5 grams would not result in a conviction.  We thus conclude that Mattie did 
not carry his burden of demonstrating that he has not been convicted of an aggravated 
felony, and we will uphold the agency’s determination that he is statutorily ineligible for 
cancellation of removal.
2
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                              
1
 One ounce is not even the smallest amount that the statute criminalizes.  Under N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:35-5(b)(12), it is a crime of the fourth degree to possess, with intent to 
distribute, “[m]arijuana in a quantity of less than one ounce.”  
2
 There was a statement by Mattie’s counsel in the appeal brief before the Board that 
Mattie was granted post-conviction relief in the New Jersey Superior Court.  The 
Government is “informed that Mattie has filed a motion to reopen and/or reconsider with 
the [Board], which remains pending.”  See Appellee’s Brief, at 15 n.4.  Our decision 
denying the instant petition for review is without prejudice to any relief the Board may 
fashion for Mattie as a result of any new developments in the New Jersey Superior Court 
relating to the validity of the conviction at issue here. 
